Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right that there is much focus at present on the practical issues and outcomes of the global summit last year, which is something that we should celebrate. It may be interesting for noble Lords to note that the Government intend shortly to lay before Parliament a Command Paper on the UN, which will include our assessment of the progress made on the implementation of the reforms agreed at the summit and on the outstanding issues to be addressed. I understand that China is one of the major obstacles.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall: My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that there is still a considerable shortfall of mental health professionals in the National Health Service? Can he say whether the arrangements for overseas doctors are likely to have an adverse impact on our ability to fill the gap in that area, which presumably will persist until the intake of students that we have been able to get as a result of the expansion of medical schools throws out professionals at the end of their training?

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: In moving Amendment No. 1, I shall speak to Amendment No. 3, which is grouped with it.
	Naturally, we support measures that would reduce violent crime, but we shall certainly need to examine all the proposals in the Bill rigorously to ensure that they are both justified and effective. We are surely justified in our scepticism of the Home Office's ability to deliver its policies effectively given the shambles revealed this week whereby more than 1,000 foreign national criminals, who should have been considered for deportation or removal, completed their prison sentences and were released without the appropriate consideration of either deportation or removal action. That is shocking. I make it clear that I do not expect the Minister to have to respond on that issue today; I have already made that clear to him outside the Chamber. I believe it is not his direct area of responsibility, and I think it would be inappropriate to hold him to account for that today. However, I give notice now that I have drafted an amendment on this matter, within the scope of the Bill, for later debate. I have sought the advice of the Public Bill Office on whether it is within the scope of the Long Title. As a result of the late development of these matters today, it has not been possible for the Public Bill Office to consider it in time for me to make it clear now whether it will be tabled. If I receive the advice of the Public Bill Office that it is within the scope of the Long Title, the amendment will be published before the end of the week.
	We support measures to give the courts more effective powers to ban individuals from licensed premises if that will materially improve public order. We need to look carefully at whether the Government's plans for drinking banning orders are worth the bureaucratic new structure that they propose to build. Drinking banning orders are an odd beast. The Government present them as a civil order, but they wear the mantle of criminal design. Debates in another place did not dispel the confusion that lies at the heart of the creation of this new order. In our debates on the amendments in this part of the Bill, we shall try to persuade the Government to do rather better.
	The amendments in this first group are probing. They seek to determine the scope of the potential prohibitions that could be included in a drinking banning order. This is a particularly important issue to be debated, given recent developments in the courts concerning anti-social behaviour orders. Of course, I appreciate that drinking banning orders are not the same as ASBOs, but they share certain characteristics, as was made clear by the right honourable Hazel Blears in another place.
	It is worth noting that earlier this month the High Court ruled that a prohibition included in an anti-social behaviour order imposed by a court was too wide. The particular prohibition banned the individual who was the subject of the order from behaving in an anti-social way for two years. That was deemed to be far too vague in its scope to be lawful. With that knowledge in mind of how wary the courts are when it comes to allowing orders and prohibitions of this kind, it is important that the Minister should clarify today exactly what the Government have in mind in Clause 1(1) and (2). Naturally, in this House we always seek to ensure that legislation is fit for purpose. If anything is left in the Bill that risks causing unnecessary difficulty in the courts at a later stage, I believe we need to address that matter now.
	Subsection (1) explains that a drinking banning order would prohibit the individual subject to the order from doing the things described in the order. I was somewhat surprised to see the use of the word "described" instead of the term "specified", which one would usually expect to see in this context. The word "described" conveys a rather more general and less explicit approach to setting out the terms of a drinking banning order. Is that what the Government intend? In any event, is that wise, given the ruling earlier this month by Lord Justice Richards and Mr Justice David Clarke?
	Amendment No. 1 simply replaces "described" with "specified". Would not that use of the word "specified" make it crystal clear that the drinking banning order must be as explicit as possible in setting out precisely what a person is banned from doing?
	Subsection (2) states that a drinking banning order,
	"may impose any prohibition on the subject".
	It qualifies that with the proviso that any such prohibition has to be,
	"necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol".
	Subsection (3) specifies what must be included in the prohibition and subsection (4) specifies what must not be included.
	That begs the question: what, therefore, may be included? Paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that there is,
	"the possibility of other relevant prohibitions also being included in the order".
	How does the Minister foresee this test of relevance being met? Amendment No. 3 suggests a couple of examples that might possibly be included. Can the Minister give the Committee further examples of what might be contained in such an order?
	Although the heading of the clause indicates that these orders are drinking banning orders, it seems that, given the width of Clause 1(2), they are not really confined at all to banning someone from drinking. Calling them "drinking banning orders" is, therefore, something of a misnomer within the current drafting of the Bill. I have tried to show that in Amendment No. 3.
	I make it clear that at this stage I certainly do not seek to bring into the debate questions about the approved courses that are the subject of government amendments later on. We shall return to that point. I am simply asking the Minister to give examples of the prohibitions on behaviour that may form the basis of the order. Those are the prohibitions that would stand apart from any requirement that may be imposed by attendance at an approved course. I consider those to be separate.
	Clause 22 gives the police powers to give directions to individuals who represent a risk of disorder, requiring them to leave a locality for up to 48 hours. Is it the Government's intention to provide in Clause 1 for powers that go beyond those powers in Clause 22? That would be tantamount to exclusion orders. It seems that these prohibitions could end up being extremely similar to bail conditions that the court can already impose, with the crucial difference that no criminal charge has been made against the individual concerned. I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, has done the Committee a singular service in pointing out two problems that arise. First, what does Clause 1 cover? Secondly, how do we avoid its breadth being tested in the courts? The structure of Clause 1 indicates that a drinking banning order is one that prohibits the individual against whom it is made from doing the things described or specified in the order. There is obviously no limitation involved in Clause 1(1). Clause 1(2) gives a broad discretion to impose any prohibition which is,
	"necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol".
	What does the phrase "while he is under the influence of alcohol" mean? In the criminal law we are familiar with the concept of a person being "drunk and disorderly". Whether a person is drunk does not take a great deal of describing. However, "under the influence of alcohol" is a much vaguer term and does not involve the question of whether a person has been disinhibited by the effects of alcohol. So it is a very vague expression. What is the difference between being drunk—a concept already punished by the criminal law—and being under the influence of alcohol?
	The next issue that arises is whether the prohibition order can contain a prohibition on a person's conduct when he is sober. The order is necessary for the purposes of protecting other persons from criminal conduct by the subject "while he is under the influence of alcohol". Supposing he is sober? Does he breach the order if he goes into a public house when he is sober if he is prohibited from doing so under Clause 1(3) when he is under the influence of alcohol? It is clearly a very important question. If a man goes into a pub sober, and then becomes drunk inside, has he breached a prohibition which prevents him "entering" licensed premises—"entering" is the word used in Clause 1(3)—when he is under the influence of drink? Divisional court, here we come: More money for lawyers for sorting out precisely what is the purport of that subsection.
	The purpose of the Conservative amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, said, is to flush out what sort of prohibition the Government have in mind. My Amendment No. 4 has the same purpose: to insert the word "appropriate" before "necessary" in Clause 1(3) so as at least to make sure that the prohibitions contained in a drinking banning order have something to do with drinking. We are all familiar now with the way in which ASBOs have been used. They have covered a variety of conduct which must go far beyond that in the minds of those who originally framed the legislation. They have been used to ban people from wearing caps, from keeping pigs or geese, from playing records of classical music and from sunbathing in a thong. All sorts of peculiar things have banned by ASBOs, and we are at least entitled to know what is to be the extent of a drinking banning order as set out in Clause 1. I await the Minister's reply with interest.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: As I explained earlier, Clause 1 introduces a new civil order, a drinking banning order, which is available to protect persons and their property from criminal or disorderly conduct by an individual while he or she is under the influence of alcohol. A drinking banning order could impose any prohibition on an individual that a court considers necessary to protect others against such conduct. That includes prohibitions with regard to an individual entering premises that sell alcohol and club premises that can supply alcohol to members and guests.
	Amendment No. 6 seeks to stipulate two situations in which a drinking banning order could not impose prohibitions on an individual. As the noble Lord explained, the first is that no prohibition should prevent a subject having access to or contact with members of their family, whether under the terms of a court order or under the terms of an agreement with his partner. The second is that an individual should not be prevented from taking his child or children to a place where they may receive medical treatment. The Bill already sets out certain effects that a prohibition cannot have, such as preventing an individual attending his place of work. These provisions ensure that we do not end up with perverse prohibitions that would inappropriately impact upon the subject of a drinking banning order.
	I understand the basis of the noble Viscount's amendments. However, there may be instances where the court may wish to impose a prohibition to protect family members from an individual's behaviour while under the influence of alcohol. So I am not persuaded that this amendment is necessary. However, I recognise that we would not want courts to impose prohibitions in drinking banning orders that would prevent an individual taking his child or children to a place where they may receive medical treatment. I expect that noble Lords could quote a never-ending list of similar situations where prohibitions would be inappropriate and should not be imposed. However, I believe that such matters are best left to the discretion of the court to consider on a case-by-case basis. However, I am happy to ensure that the kind of example that the noble Viscount drew to our attention is included in drinking banning order guidance, as it fits exactly the requirements that we will have to set out so that it can be best understood by those who would give effect to the orders.
	Amendment No. 114 is the same as that which has been proposed for drinking banning orders, but for directions to leave. I believe that it is therefore appropriate to discuss it at the same time, and the noble Viscount has grouped it with Amendment No. 6. Clause 22 allows a constable to direct a person to leave a locality. Subsection (4) provides that no prohibition can be given by a constable if it prevents the individual to whom it is given having access to his home, to his place of work, to a place that he needs to attend to receive education, training or medical treatment, or to a place that he has been ordered to attend. The amendment would, again, add the same two situations as those proposed in the amendment on drinking banning orders.
	For directions to leave, the provisions already in the Bill seek to set out the situations in which lack of access would be highly counter-productive for the individual, such as being unable to attend his place of employment. They are the basics required to ensure that we do not end up with nonsensical unintended consequences. Again, I am not persuaded that it would be right to include anything in the Bill on the need to ensure that the direction does not prevent someone having access to, or contact with, members of his family. It is already the case that a direction to leave cannot prevent someone having access to his home—that is where a person's family is most likely to live. A direction lasts only for a maximum of 48 hours, so it is a very short-term arrangement.
	I recognise that we would not want a direction to be given that prevented an individual taking his child or children to a place where they might receive medical treatment. I am not sure under what circumstances that might arise, as the basis for a direction to leave is that it should be given only if it is necessary to prevent alcohol-related crime or disorder and it can last only for a maximum 48 hours. It is most likely that directions will be given from a town or city centre and the area that has a concentration of pubs and clubs. However, as in the case for drinking banning orders, I am happy to ensure that this is covered specifically in guidance on directions to leave. I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Viscount will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: At this stage, I would like to speak to the amendments grouped with the government amendments, which I appreciate is rather complicated. I fear that I have made life very difficult for the Chairman because, in attempting to help the Bill team and the rest of the Chamber, I have tabled a significant number of amendments to the Government's new clauses. This makes it rather difficult to follow the Marshalled List, for me as well as for everyone else.
	I would like to speak to Amendments Nos. 10 to 14, 38 to 41, 43 to 46, 58 and 59, 15 of which are in eight sub-groups. If the Government's new clauses had appeared in the original draft of the Bill, we might have had the luxury of dealing with these very important matters in separate groupings. I would therefore have de-grouped them and not burdened the House with a long speech, which I now have to give to respond to the Government's presentation of these clauses.
	First, I put on record the fact that I am very grateful to the Minister for trying to address some of my amendments immediately. He has managed to take away some of the information that I shall have to give, but not a lot, I have to say. He was right to say that the Government have responded helpfully to proposals advanced by my honourable friend Humfrey Malins in another place. The difficulty is that, in tabling these new amendments last Thursday, the Government have at first blush given a much wider power to the courts than my honourable friend had anticipated. I therefore tabled the amendments to try to probe the Government's intentions very fully. The letter that was sent to me and, I suspect, to other noble Lords who spoke on Second Reading merely says that the new proposals allow courts to refer an individual to attend voluntarily an approved alcohol intervention course, the successful completion of which could lead to a reduction in the length of the drinking banning order. The letter goes on to say that the Government believe that this will complement the drinking banning order arrangements by addressing an individual's behaviour as well as imposing prohibitions on them. That rather limited explanation is the reason why I felt I had to table a series of amendments to give the Bill team at least the hope of trying to work out where my objections might lie.
	All my amendments today are probing, and we will need to consider the Government's further responses before deciding whether these new clauses need to be improved on Report or whether everything can satisfactorily be left to guidance, which I think will be the mainstay of the Minister's speaking notes at all stages of the Bill, by the sound of it. We may have to help him to put guidance into the Bill before it leaves this House.
	Although these new clauses may well prove to be welcome, as I think they will be, we in this House are the only ones who will have the luxury of time to debate them properly. When they go to another place they will form part of the whole group of Lords amendments, and we know that the time allocated for consideration of Lords amendments is notoriously inadequate. That is my apology for taking some time on them today.
	Have the Government consulted Alcohol Concern or any other related organisation on the specific drafting of these new clauses, and if so, with what results? As soon as I saw the amendments, I telephoned Alcohol Concern and although, understandably, staff were on leave at last week, I want to put on record my heartfelt thanks to Helen Symons at Alcohol Concern for turning around a response this week. Broadly speaking, she said that Alcohol Concern very much welcomes the fact that the Government have responded to the argument that the punitive action of the DBOs needs to go hand-in-hand with proactive measures to change the way people drink if it is to be truly effective. She has given a list of very pertinent questions. I have tried to incorporate them into my list of questions on the relevant amendments. As this is a late submission by Helen Symons, I was able to look at them only at two o'clock today, so I have not been able to give advance notice of the questions to the Minister. However, having gone through them today, I shall be happy to provide the e-mail to his Bill team later on.
	My first subgroup of amendments comprises Amendments Nos. 10, 11 and 12. It probes the purpose of the approved course that is to be specified in the order. The amendments severally describe the approved courses as promoting rehabilitation, alcohol awareness and anger management. Amendment No. 10, which triggered all this off, is the one that was tabled by my honourable friend Humfrey Malins in another place.
	I do not intend to go into the detail of what those three objectives might achieve—I think the Minister has addressed that. He has said why he does not think it is right to put the detail of that in the clause itself. My questions relate to why the Government have overcome their initial objection. On 13 October, the Government rejected the proposal of my honourable friend Humfrey Malins on the basis that DBOs are civil orders and not criminal penalties. Hazel Blears stated:
	"When there is a conviction, it is . . . open to the court to direct a mandatory course of action involving rehabilitation, education, drug support and drink support".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 13/10/05; col. 22.]
	She quite rightly pointed out that human rights issues are involved and that it would be wrong to force people to take up treatment if they do not wish to do so in the absence of a criminal penalty. She said, of course, that she would take it away for consideration and today we have the result.
	This means that the Government have to address the question of why they are now sure that these proposals do not offend against the human rights issues referred to by Hazel Blears. I am glad that the Government think they do not offend, but I think that we and, in future, the courts need to be reassured that they do not offend human rights issues. Of course, I appreciate that the Government's proposals have the advantage of not, strictly speaking, forcing an individual to go on an approved course; they ask an individual to agree to that. However, offering a discount is such an inducement that it will be very difficult for someone to say, "No". If people are being offered a reduction in the period of a DBO if they take up a course and complete it satisfactorily, I need to be reassured that that does not offend against the principles that governed the Minister in the other place saying that this was not a way forward.
	My second subgroup comprises Amendment No. 13, which relates to the Government publicising this in an accessible format. The Minister says that this is already covered because they will put out the information about the DBOs in plain language and that that covers it. However, Amendment No. 9 says that the court must provide the information "whether in writing or otherwise". I would like to know what the "or otherwise" conveys. It might mean that it could be in Braille, Easyread or in some format that was accessible to someone who could not necessarily read it; it could be translated into another language. I do not think "plain language" covers it. I just want to be reassured about what "or otherwise" might convey.
	The third subgroup comprises Amendment No. 14. This would require the court to give a warning about the possible consequences of a failure to complete the course. The Minister says, "Let us leave that to the court to decide". I had in mind a situation where a court currently imposes a community penalty. The court is required to give guidance to a person before it on what will happen to them if they do not complete the course. It might be helpful for courts to be advised that this is good practice and that as a matter of course they should give guidance about the possible consequences of failing to complete. That might make a person more ready to let the people running the course know as soon as possible if they were unable to attend on a particular day for a good reason—it might be to attend the funeral of a close relative or to attend a job interview. I want to get that good practice into the system. We keep being told that we should not worry as it will be in the guidance, but we are not seeing the guidance. That is why I need to be persistent—nay awkward and difficult—and to keep asking the questions today.
	I now move on to the amendments that affect the Government's new clause on approved courses. The next subgroup—Amendments Nos. 38 and 40—probes the nature of the organisations or persons that the Government expect to license the approved courses. The Government say they do not want to restrict the kind of persons or organisations who could run this. But—and I welcome his statement here—the Minister said that they need the right experience. That is absolutely right. Alcohol Concern points out that it is crucial that whoever runs the course is properly trained in delivering alcohol interventions. Are the Government really intending that these courses will be delivered only by social services and probation services? Can they give an assurance that other relevant organisations—charities and people with real experience in this field—would be favourably considered as organisations qualified to run these approved courses?
	The fifth subgroup is covered by Amendments Nos. 39 and 41. These are the old-fashioned "may/shall" amendments and are intended to probe the nature of the regulations made by the Secretary of State in relation to the approval of courses that may be undertaken. Amendment No. 39 would require the Secretary of State to take into account any recommendations made by persons appointed by the Secretary of State to consider applications to run approved courses. Amendment No. 39 has been tabled because I want to know who will be processing these applications to run courses. Will it be Home Office civil servants? Will it be an independent body appointed by the Secretary of State to process the applications? Will it be in-house or out of house? Will it be in-house, with a specifically nominated group of civil servants who would have expertise, or will it be out of house, with an independent body of persons appointed with long experience in these matters? Alcohol Concern says:
	"We would like to seek assurances that the Secretary of State will consult with experts in the field before approving the content of any courses, and that the focus of the course will be changing behaviour, not just raising awareness".
	It continues:
	"It is important that the course is linked in with the Department of Health's focus on screening and brief interventions to ensure that everyone who comes through the course is referred on to appropriate treatment if necessary".
	That seems to be very wise advice.
	Amendment No. 41 requires the Secretary of State to include in the regulations the matters set out in subsection (5). The provisions to be covered in the regulations are significant and it would be unthinkable if the Secretary of State were not to include them in the regulations. This "may/shall" amendment is simply there to probe the details behind the matters listed in subsection (5). Paragraph (a) is a provision for the making of applications for approval. Does this mean prescribing the administration of processing applications? There are good management issues here, such as the time to process the applications and the reasons to be given if the Secretary of State refuses an application. Is that what the Government intend to be covered?
	Subsection (5)(b) covers the provisions on the payment of fees. Do the Government expect different charges to be set in different parts of the country, and for the charges to differ depending on the nature of the organisation running the course? What happens if a person elects to go on a course when they are financially able to take on the payments, but then loses their job or faces some other financial crisis and no longer can afford to pay? What impact would that have on the provisions in the new clause about certificates on completion of approved courses? If someone cannot complete their attendance, they will get neither the certificate nor the discount on the period of the DBN.
	Subsection (5)(d) covers monitoring the running of these courses and closing them down if it all goes wrong. Who will carry out the monitoring? Is it to be the Home Office, the local authority or some other body? To quote Alcohol Concern again, it says:
	"It is crucial that the courses are properly evaluated for numbers of people taking them up, changes in behaviour and reductions in reoffending rates".
	The sixth group covers Amendments Nos. 43 and 44. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that he agrees that a person should not suffer if a course is cancelled because of problems encountered by the supplier. He said that it is an unlikely scenario and that it has never happened without notice. I shall not go further because the noble Lord has said that this will be left to guidance. In those circumstances, he has given as full an answer as I can expect.
	In the seventh group, Amendment No. 46 seeks to delete paragraph (c). Again, the noble Lord has covered the point. The final group covers the government amendments to Clause 11. The purpose of my Amendments Nos. 58 and 59 is to make the order-making power applying to the Government's new clause subject to the affirmative procedure. Of course the Opposition always prefer the affirmative process where it is responsible to seek it because another place then has at least a chance of proper time being allocated for debate. This House has more opportunities to pray against negative resolutions, certainly more so than the other place. The noble Lord has said, "Don't worry about it. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has already considered this and given it a clean bill of health. We do not need the affirmative resolution procedure". While of course the committee has looked at the other clauses, I am not aware that it has had a chance to consider these new provisions. If the noble Lord tells me that it has already done so and I have missed the report that will have been produced since the publication of these clauses last Thursday, I accept that and will have someone scurry along to the Printed Paper Office to collect it. However, I do not think that the Select Committee has yet had an opportunity to look at these specific clauses. That is the reason for tabling Amendments Nos. 58 and 59. These are welcome, interesting and certainly significant new clauses and it may be that, at least in the first instance, the affirmative procedure should be applied to the regulations governing them. If that system were applied to the first set, it might then be perfectly proper for the negative resolution procedure to apply thereafter.
	Having wearied all noble Lords present, I hope that I have at least raised some pertinent questions.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: Amendment No. 15 brings us to a rather different topic. I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 24, 34 and 35, which are grouped with it. They are concerned with the naming and shaming of individuals between the ages of 16 and 18 who are made the subject of these orders.
	The Government have taken a robust view of naming and shaming people who are subject to ASBOs. On 1 March, the Home Secretary, Mr Clarke, calling on local authorities to name and shame, said:
	"Too many communities are still blighted by the mindless behaviour of a few yobs, who can ruin the quality of life for everyone. Many offenders think that they are untouchable and above the law. If they thought there would be a news blackout on their actions they must now think again. Publicising ASBOs has been tested in the courts and today we are making the position crystal clear—your photo could be all over the local media, your local community will know who you are and breaching an ASBO could land you in prison".
	I suppose that one might say of Mr Clarke that his photo is all over the media and that the community knows who is, but I shall not pursue that.
	However, an opposite view is put forward by Professor Al Aynsley-Green, who is England's first Children's Commissioner. Speaking on a Channel 4 programme in February, he said that naming and shaming is not in a child's best interests. These amendments are concerned with people between the ages of 16 and 18, who are "children" as defined in United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Professor Aynsley-Green said of naming and shaming:
	"I'm very concerned about this because it is a breach of one of the UN Conventional Rights of the Child's articles. Children have the right to privacy, and I'm very alarmed when invitations are expressed through the media to get the local people to name and shame the young people, particularly children under the age of criminal responsibility".
	Fortunately, the drinking banning orders are not concerned with children of that age. Professor Aynsley-Green continued:
	"I think it affects both the older generation and the younger generation. The incessant portrayal of children as thugs and hooligans and yobs reinforces the fears that the other generation has . . . It influences political directions, it influences political policy and it certainly influences possible changes in legislation".
	He was also concerned that,
	"the incessant dispersal, the incessant pressure of ASBOs are generating alienation of a generation of young people from law and authority and that can only be seriously damaging to our society in the future, if we have a generation now who are children who grow up as adults who do not respect law and order and do not respect the power of authority".
	It is all very well for the Home Secretary to say, "Publish their names! Publish their photographs! Let the neighbours tell the authorities that they are in breach of this order or that order or prohibition", but the consequence, as fully outlined by the Children's Commissioner, will be the alienation of young people from authority. If that goes for ASBOs, so it will go for the new drinking banning orders. The only difference that I see is that, in the context of drinking, there may be naming, but there will be little shaming of the person who has his photograph plastered everywhere—in the present culture of drinking, it might be more a badge of honour.
	Naming and shaming is not a proportionate response to youth drinking. I suggest to the Government that it will not assist the proposals for treatment courses that we have just acclaimed to have a person coming out of the place where he has taken the course to see his picture and details plastered all over the place and to have the population pointing at him. So I ask the Government to think again about 16 to 18 year-olds, which is the age group to which my amendments relate. I ask them to think again about the whole policy of naming and shaming when it comes to ASBOs, but, in particular, not to extend it to the drinking banning orders. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: These amendments have given rise to a useful short debate on the two issues to which they relate: the age level at which drinking banning orders should kick in, and the issue of publicity for those affected by them. I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to the debate. I have long admired the notion that, before we make legislative changes, they should be well informed. We like to think that this legislation is the product of well informed debate and sound information on the ground.
	I shall take the amendments in turn and deal in good measure with both sets of issues raised. Amendment No. 15 seeks to raise the minimum age at which a drinking banning order can be applied from 16 to 18. The Government's consultation paper, Drinking Responsibly: The Government's Proposals, published earlier this year, proposed that drinking banning orders should apply to those aged 16 or older. By setting the minimum age for an order at 16, it is intended that those drinking while underage who are involved in criminal or disorderly conduct while under the influence of drink are held to account for their conduct.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, said that, although she was supporting the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, she had no particular objection to the approach that we were adopting in this but that she was looking for consistency of provision. I certainly understand the noble Baroness's point, but it is about making this fit with the reality out there. As my noble friends Lord Brooke and Lord Borrie said, drinking in teenagers starts rather earlier than 18, and sometimes rather earlier than 16. As a parent of teenage children, I know from my own experience that that is the case. We have to recognise what is going on in the wider society and, in particular, in our towns and cities. This set of measures is targeted very specifically at that.
	The Government believe that raising the age at which an order can apply to 18 could well fail to address the real problem of underage drinking and would enable young people to escape the consequences of their actions. It fails to recognise specifically that an order may be appropriate to protect other persons from this type of conduct. I would not want us to do anything in your Lordships' House that undermined the use of drinking banning orders by restricting them to those aged over 18.
	In addition, the amendment fails to recognise the evidence. As I said earlier, I am an admirer of legislation brought forward on the basis of good debate and good information, and the evidence base for this is very clear. The Interim Analytical Report of the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Alcohol Harm Reduction project—that is a bit of a mouthful but it is no doubt well intended for all of that—suggested that those aged 16 to 24 are more likely than all other age groups to binge-drink. Our experience in towns and cities tells us exactly that. In addition, the characteristics of offenders identified in the British Crime Survey tell us that for alcohol-related assaults, offenders generally tend to be aged 16 or older. Those are additional reasons why we would not want to undermine the use of drinking banning orders by restricting them to those aged over 18. By doing so, we might well miss an important cohort of young people who would benefit greatly from the approach that we are intending to be adopted through the use of drinking banning orders.
	I also take issue with another amendment—Amendment No. 34—tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, to which he did not refer. It would limit fines for breaches of drinking banning orders to those aged 18 and above. I cannot see the benefit of that amendment. It would mean that those aged under 18 should not be punished for breaching a drinking banning order, and I hope that other noble Lords will agree with our position on this.
	I turn to Amendments Nos. 24 and 35, which would reimpose automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for orders on conviction involving young people and when there is a breach of an order by a young person. I am well aware of the noble Lord's concerns, which were raised on Second Reading, about what he described as naming and shaming and putting up photographs of those who are subject to anti-social behaviour orders.
	The Bill lifts automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for drinking and banning orders involving young people. In proceedings brought against a young person of 16 to 17 for an order or when an order has been breached, reporting restrictions will not automatically be imposed. That will allow the press to report cases to inform local communities of action being taken to deal with activity that blights and is a blot on many neighbourhoods.
	Of course it is the case—and this reassurance is important—that the courts will retain discretion to apply reporting restrictions if they consider it appropriate in the circumstances. We are not creating a situation in which all cases involving young people will automatically be reported. While we are reversing the presumption, we are not preventing the courts imposing reporting restrictions when it would be appropriate to do so. I do not think that we should undermine what is after all an important form of communication and an important route of reporting action that has been taken to deal with the behaviour of individuals when it is appropriate to do so. I share the view of the noble Lords, Lord Borrie and Lord Brookman, that it is right that we in the community understand the action that has been taken in our name, so that we can identify those who cause problems in particular locations. I think that a degree of obloquy is relevant in certain circumstances, which is why we encourage publicity in some cases. Ultimately, it will be for the court to take a view on the issue.
	Evidence suggests that we should have an age restriction that begins at 16 and upwards. We know from evidence that young people between the ages of 16 and 24 are more likely to be involved in binge drinking and the sort of drinking that attracts the attention of the courts and the use of drinking banning orders. We know that if we can catch the problem at an earlier stage it is much less likely to turn out to be a bigger problem as the individuals get older. If we can affect and influence young people who have a drinking problem at that age, perhaps we can save them, through the use of drinking banning orders and the conditions and prohibitions that apply, from a life that is blighted by alcohol and causes consistent concern. That is the overriding good that we seek to capture and make available to communities.
	For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment. For similar reasons, I ask him not to press his later amendments, which he believes should apply and restrict the ability of the press to report on court cases involving drinking banning orders.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: Across the whole breadth of the criminal law, it is a matter of public policy which is agreed to by all parties and in accordance with the covenant on the Rights of the Child, to which this country is a signatory, that we have thought it right to protect young people up to the age of 18, so that if a person is charged even with the most serious offence of murder, his identity will not be released. That is the policy that this country has adopted.
	We are now introducing a completely new concept. The breach of this civil order will lead to a criminal offence, and we are lowering the standard for this civil order. We are saying to young people: "You should be in the newspaper. Everybody should know all about you. If you want to make a noise or kick a dustbin"—to get back to our earlier debate—"or if you want to be disorderly in a way that affects others, then you can expect your name and photograph to be published". Is it really that serious an issue that we have to go against the whole trend of public policy in this country of trying to protect young people until the age of 18? What is the reality, asked the noble Lord, Lord Brooke. We probably all have different concepts of reality. Is it really the truth that packs of 16 to 18 year-olds are going into public houses, getting drink to which they are not entitled and running riot?
	My own view of reality—and I am fairly close to the ground in my part of the world—is that it is people with a bit of money in their pocket before they take on the responsibilities of a family who are causing problems and at whom such orders should be addressed. If it is not them, it is what we have called the rough sleepers who have alcohol or drug dependence. Those are the problem people at whom the drinking banning order is directed. It is a sad day when it comes to something like disorderly conduct that all the safeguards that we have recognised, which have developed over many years, should be thrown away and young people should be pilloried in the way that the Government suggest.
	If a young person between the ages of 16 and 18 commits an offence—if he is guilty of criminal damage; if he is drinking under age; if he is drunk and disorderly; if he is urinating in a public place; if he is swearing at people—he can be taken to a youth court and dealt with in that protective way that we have developed. But under this provision the principle is weakened and his protection is weakened. It is a sad day. I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions. Many good points were made against the proposition that I am advancing, which I shall consider with care. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: The intention is to probe the effect of subsection (3) of Clause 3. Clause 3 enables relevant authorities to apply to the county court for a drinking banning order against an individual in certain circumstances. Those relevant authorities are the chief officer of police, the chief constable of the British Transport Police force, and a local authority.
	Where proceedings are already underway in a county court and the authorities are not involved in any way in those proceedings—not a party to them—subsection (3) allows those authorities to get involved just so that they can apply for a drinking banning order against one of the people who are already involved in the proceedings. In effect, subsection (3) allows relevant authorities which should not otherwise be involved to get stuck in.
	Is it not the case that the majority of cases in the county court are likely to be applications for non-molestation orders in private family proceedings? Subsection (3) would therefore surely mean that the police or local authority would have the right to become directly involved in private family proceedings and apply for a drinking banning order against one, or perhaps both, of the parties. Is it the Government's intention that this should be the purpose of subsection (3)?
	I appreciate that private family proceedings would not immediately be a matter of public knowledge. But presumably social services, the police or probation might well have knowledge of the circumstances which gave rise to the application for a non-molestation order and therefore they would be in a position to know that the case was in the list. My concern, therefore, is that subsection (3) could give a much wider power to the police and local authorities than the Bill at first implies.
	When I tabled this amendment, I rather hoped that the Ministers would say, "No, this is not what we intended, and therefore we are going to make sure that we clarify the clause". Then earlier today I listened to the responses given by the Minister to other amendments and I became concerned that perhaps the Government had an intention that I hoped they did not. When the Minister responded to Amendment No. 49, which was grouped with Amendment No. 2, he tried to convey that the Government intend that actions that take place in private at home could indeed lead to a drinking banning order being made. I am going one step further and asking whether it applies within the context of county court proceedings.
	In response to Amendment No. 6, the Minister said that the Government could envisage preventing access to family. Surely the Children Act directs that the welfare of children is paramount, although the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, in replying to Amendment No. 7, said that the needs of the community are paramount.
	I hope that the Minister is able to say that subsection (3) categorically rules out intervention by the state in private proceedings in non-molestation orders in the county court. If he is not able to give that assurance, I shall certainly be concerned and will want to look at the matter again on Report. If he is able to give that assurance, I shall need to know how that can be clarified in the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment. Whether what I say will actually fully answer her point I am not sure, but I will give it a go and hope that she will be mollified by my words.
	I intend to explain the relevance of it in the context of where her amendment is pitched. The Bill provides for the police and local authorities, known as relevant authorities, to apply to the county court to be joined to proceedings, if they are not party to the proceedings, in order to apply for a drinking banning order. The amendment would mean that the relevant authorities would not be able to take this route to seek a drinking banning order.
	For drinking banning orders via the county court, relevant authorities can apply for a drinking banning order against an individual who is already party to proceedings in the county court. If the relevant authority is not a party to such proceedings, it can apply to the court to be joined in order to apply for a drinking banning order. The authority can also make an application for another individual to be joined to the proceedings where that individual has engaged in criminal or disorderly conduct while under the influence of alcohol, and where that conduct is material in relation to the proceedings. For those reasons I cannot see the benefit of restricting the scope for relevant authorities to seek a drinking banning order where it is necessary to do so.
	The noble Baroness specifically raised non-molestation orders and she rightly described those as being plainly domestic proceedings. She raised the issue, in essence, of the state intervening in a set of proceedings in a way which she thought was not appropriate, given what we are trying to achieve more broadly with this legislation. It would be fair to put it on record that it is not that instance that we are trying to capture by enabling these proceedings to be taken in the county court.
	The best thing I can do is give an example of where we think an application might be sought through the county court for a drinking banning order. Injunctions under Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 can be made where a person has caused a public nuisance. We think that might be the sort of instance where a drinking banning order could be pursued through the county court route. I think it fair to say that we are not seeking to extend into proceedings in the county court. I well understand the noble Baroness's nervousness about us approaching other matters that county courts consider in the way in which she suggested.
	I am happy to reflect further on what she said and provide her with some further reassurance outside the Chamber today. I suspect that that is important, not just for today's debate but to ensure that we can clarify the issue to her total satisfaction. I think that we have a very useful provision here. Off the top of my head, I can think of other circumstances where it might perhaps be appropriate for the local authority or the police to seek a drinking banning order through the county court. We need to provide some better clarification on that issue so that we have a common understanding of why that set of proceedings would be more appropriate.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister. I shall need to look carefully at his reply in the context of the procedures and of his honourable friend's remarks in another place. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: I shall consider carefully what the Minister says. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: I look forward to receiving and studying them with anticipation. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Amendment No. 26 would require any order made by the Secretary of State under Clause 10(5) to be made by way of the draft affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure. Orders under that subsection could extend the range of persons who can prosecute for breaches of a drinking banning order, and might be used if we can expand the range of persons who can apply for drinking banning orders. I cannot be more specific than that in response to the noble Lord's point.
	It would not, in our view, be a good use of parliamentary time to require all such orders to be debated. It is entirely appropriate for an order such as this to be made by the Home Secretary and then laid before Parliament. Noble Lords can of course pray in aid against the order when it has been laid if they feel that that is right and appropriate. I also remind your Lordships' House that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was content with the level of scrutiny that we propose here. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press his amendment to a vote.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: With a sense of relief, we move from drinking banning orders to alcohol disorder zones, an area which is no less contentious in all sorts of ways. The noble Lord will recall that at Second Reading we supported the basic concept behind alcohol disorder zones. It is a proper mechanism for recovering the costs of policing particular areas which cause trouble from the licensed premises that are the focus of the trouble. A number of issues are left to be determined. On the one hand, we have to determine how much those charges should be and, on the other, we have to determine whether everyone who holds a licence in a particular zone should pay. Another issue is how long those alcohol disorder zones should continue. We all recognise that there is a great temptation for a local authority to see this as an additional tax on business within the area affected.
	Amendments Nos. 61 and 62 address the question of how much. It is suggested that instead of imposition by a local authority, it should be "or local authorities", in the event that that zone falls within the area of two local authorities. More importantly, it is also suggested that the charges to be paid to the authority for each month should be limited. The amendment, which at this stage is probing, is that the charge should be at an annual rate of no greater than 3 per cent of a premises' rateable value. We think it is important that businesses should not be sunk by an alcohol disorder zone. It may not assist their business to find their neighbourhood designated as such. Of course, it may be within a licensee's own hands to do something about it. But the charge on the business should not so affect the profits of that business that it cannot continue. Therefore, this is a suggestion that we put forward for the Government's consideration as a limitation on the charge.
	Amendment No.65 is consequential, while Amendment No.70, which is to leave out subsection (8), deals with the payment, collection and enforcement of charges and the determination of questions about liability. No doubt that is a matter which will be subject to further debate. For the moment, this group of amendments is concerned with maintaining a limit on the cost to business. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: This is indeed an important clause. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, points out, the creation of the alcohol disorder zones is a contentious matter. It means that the Secretary of State can make provision enabling a local authority to make monthly charges against licence holders in their area. Although we understand that there may be a need to make such changes in theory, we are sure it will be important to protect premises which control their own premises impeccably. Why should they have to pay for the cost of dealing with the disorder caused by others who may not even be licensees? Throughout all the debates on these issues and future groups, the main thrust of our argument will be on that issue. In the meantime, this is a very useful probing amendment. It is important to know the Government's intention on the limit of the amount that licensees might reasonably be expected to pay each month. As presently drafted, the Bill gives a wide power to impose an extra business tax, as and when a local authority pleases. We need guidance from the Government now—not just printed guidance in the future—about the kind of burden they think it will be reasonable for licensees to face.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I agree that it is useful to debate this area, which I readily accept could be considered by some as contentious. I understand why these probing amendments have been moved. They rightly focus on the arrangements for administering the charge, which is raised under Clause 12. Amendment No. 61 would provide for the charge to be paid to "local authorities" in addition to a local authority. We do not see the need to make the amendment. The Bill does not enable alcohol disorder zones to straddle local authority boundaries. But it has to be recognised, and it would be quite right, that two adjacent local authorities designate areas as alcohol disorder zones where those areas are contiguous to each other. In that situation, each local authority would collect charges from the premises in its area; for example, in cases where there is a night-time economy centre which straddles two local authority areas, as is likely in many of our towns and cities. If the amendment was aimed at areas where there are two-tier authorities, then again we think the amendment is unnecessary. If the county council provides additional services to an alcohol disorder zone, the local authority would designate the alcohol disorder zone and collect the charge and pay a proportion on it accordingly. However, as has been well trailed before this discussion, this is an issue on which I can offer assurance. The assurance is that those situations will be covered in the guidance on alcohol disorder zones. I think it is right that they are, because there will need to be some detail within those guidance notes.
	Amendment No.62 would insert a cap on the level of the compulsory charge in an alcohol disorder zone. The amendment would set that at the monthly equivalent of 3 per cent of premises' annual rateable value. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of a cap on the compulsory charge in an alcohol disorder zone. I think that he mentioned at Second Reading the matter of when it was discussed in another place and my right honourable friend Hazel Blears, the Minister of State, undertook to consider the matter further.
	The noble Lord touched on a number of issues. The charge needs to be set at a meaningful level which is sufficient to recoup local agencies' costs in mounting effective enforcement interventions based on what is required to properly reduce crime and disorder in any given locality. At the same time we take the view that the charge needs to be enforceable and payable. We are not about the business of setting charges at a level which forces people to cease trading. We do not want the charge to act as a disincentive to business formation and to those who are in the business of providing the services of a pub, a club, an off-licence and so on. We firmly take the view that the charge needs to reflect the last-resort nature of alcohol disorder zones and help incentivise local action. We need to bear in mind the relative costs of the type of excellent voluntary arrangements currently in place in some areas, which were helpfully referred to at Second Reading. Having considered this, we believe that we should not put a cap on the charge on the face of the Bill. I do not believe that a cap, arbitrarily set, will deliver what we are looking for here. However, when we debate the regulations, we will need to ensure that we build in sufficient flexibility to enable them to meet local requirements. We will nevertheless need to provide checks and balances to meet what is intended.
	I understand the concern. I do not know whether setting the charge at 3 per cent of annual rateable value is right. I am not sure whether the noble Lord thinks it is absolutely right. But there could be a problem if we set a level in legislation. We need flexibility. That is where I think secondary legislation has a value, not least because it means that between now and then we can talk to the local authorities and to the trade and get it right. The important thing is that we get the principles right, that it does not act as a disincentive, and that it acts as an encouragement to get collective action at work—in most cases short of alcohol disorder zones—in areas where there is a commonly perceived problem with unruliness and disorderly behaviour.
	Amendment No. 65 would strengthen the link between those rates of charges and the charging power at subsection (1). Again, this is not an amendment that we think is necessary. It is very clear that Clause 12 deals with regulations for the power to impose charges in alcohol disorder zones.
	Amendment No. 70, which would remove subsection (8) from Clause 12, provides that the Secretary of State may simply make regulations about the payment, collection, enforcement, liability and appeals concerning the charge. I am slightly puzzled by the amendment because I do not see how it would confer any benefit other than to leave a considerable gap in the scope of the regulations without trying to compensate for it anywhere else in the Bill.
	While we accept that this is an important debate, we do not think it appropriate to deal with the detail in the Bill itself. It is right that we should consult further and fine-tune the detail so that we end up with a charging regime that reflects the importance of recouping local agency costs, encourages participation in all actions which fall short of creating an alcohol disorder zone and acknowledges the fact that such zones are in essence a measure of last resort designed to encourage collective action against a commonly perceived problem with alcohol-related disorder.
	For the reasons I have gone through in my response, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: I think that that nervousness will remain after the noble Lord's last reply. I wonder whether he and his officials could give some thought to how to give an assurance that the charges will not simply go sky high and that some control will be exercised over the level of charges. As he said, I am not wedded to any particular percentage of the annual rateable value; all I seek to suggest is to introduce a mechanism that introduces a form of control, even if the word "cap" is not acceptable.
	The second thing I took from the Minister's reply is that it is not the wish of the Government to put people out of business. I am sure that when these charges are considered and calculated, the costs to a particular business of taking appropriate measures to deal with the problem will also be taken into account. It cannot be cost free to have to deal with disorder in a particular zone; otherwise no charges would be imposed. So there is a double burden of charges in the form of the charge payable to the local authority and a charge for the actual measures that the licensee wishes to take. If those are allowed to go out of control, the Government will have the undesirable consequence of businesses ceasing to trade. As a result, an area would become not just an alcohol disorder zone but a desert where you cannot get a drink. No doubt that would be even worse.
	Perhaps the Minister will be able to think of a mechanism by which the charges can be controlled. I see that he is indicating his assent. On that basis I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I recognise that the amendment would strengthen the wording in Clause 12 and have the effect of requiring the Secretary of State to specify in regulations exactly what services the moneys raised by the compulsory charge can be spent on. I see where the noble Baroness is coming from with this amendment. We also want to ensure that the money raised goes to tackle alcohol-related crime and disorder, but the amendment is not necessary. The regulations will need to include the range of interventions covered by the charge and we can offer an assurance on that. The guidance will also cover the interventions which should be deployed. I do not doubt that those subjects will be covered in discussions with the police and local government associations. I also do not doubt that the associations will want to offer encouragement to their authorities on what is to be considered as best practice. We think that that approach will work best.
	The noble Baroness is right to be wary of local authorities going off on a frolic of their own. We certainly do not want to see that. I understand from my political background that that can happen from time to time. But we are aiming for practical and hard-nosed measures. If we reach a point where there is an alcohol-related crime and disorder problem in an area and it is necessary to put in place an alcohol disorder zone, by that stage exactly what is required will probably be understood by the local authority, the police and in all probability by many of the local businesses—in particular those in the trade of selling alcohol. The measures will focus on the particular needs of the community concerned.
	I understand the point being made in the amendment. We are at one with the noble Baroness in her objective, but this issue will be covered in regulations, guidance and no doubt, as I said, by best practice as well.

Lord Glentoran: My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing forward this order. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Clifton, for giving us the opportunity to debate his amendment. As far as I and my party are concerned, the most relevant point made by the noble Lord, Lord Smith, was the last one. This is an extremely difficult subject; reorganisation of local government, as I said in Committee, has been close to my heart ever since I have had the privilege of being in your Lordships' House and spokesman for Her Majesty's Opposition. I am absolutely certain that reorganisation is right; I am less certain—even my party and I do not agree to the nearest digit—about the ideal number of local authorities. Inevitably but sadly, we are in the strange, very undemocratic situation, in which the Government bring forward a number that nobody likes very much and we have only two alternatives. One is to say no and try to vote it out, which I think is absolutely wrong; the other is to accept what the Government say, which is also probably absolutely wrong.
	I know that the Minister agrees with me that these decisions should be made by the Assembly and by the people of Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, this is not possible because the Assembly is not sitting. I would very much have preferred—and it is an easy emotional wish—the Government to have refrained from introducing the order until such time as the Assembly was back and in some position to give us in this House a guide on where their views really lay. Unfortunately, that is not the position; although we and the Government can say that when the Assembly settles down to work, they can change it, we know that it will never succeed in changing it because that will need cross-party support. The complications of the voting system, with the d'Hondt agreements and so on, will prevent this change from ever taking place.
	I do not believe that Sinn Fein will move from its position of wanting six or seven councils or that the unionist parties will move from their position of wanting 10 to 15. There will never be agreement on this in the Assembly in Northern Ireland, and that is very sad. Maybe it will reach agreement on a different number from that which the Minister is putting forward today. Pigs might fly. But I would rather see the reorganisation of local government getting under way now or in the very near future than let it go completely into some dustbin to be resurrected God knows when in the future when the Assembly in Belfast is able to act and legislate on it.

Lord Maginnis of Drumglass: My Lords, suppose local government in England was to be fundamentally reformed. Would the Government even contemplate doing so by Order in Council, or would the political parties and the electorate here expect a proper Bill that could be debated, amended and put to a vote as that Bill moved from stage to stage?
	I honestly regret having to evaluate this Order in Council as a deliberately perverse and bad piece of legislation designed to meet only the sectarian demands of the most intransigent elements of Sinn Fein and unable to be justified on any reasonable grounds. Would Secretary of State Hain accept local government for Wales on the basis of tenuous support from only one minority party? Of course not and neither is it a sensible or practical basis for what Northern Ireland needs in terms of local government reform.
	This is punitive legislation designed to bully the majority of citizens because their elected representatives have failed to sustain a devolved Assembly. That has happened because the Provisional IRA, or Sinn Fein, is in that Assembly while still engaged in every conceivable form of criminality. Many feel that to work to that baseline means that Northern Ireland is being surrendered to corrupt elements by a Secretary of State who refuses to listen to us.
	For many it is the choice between a rock and a hard place. While I may be at variance with those who lack the courage to face up to the lesser of two evils and get back to having an Assembly, I understand and respect their position. I fought terrorism and then, for almost a quarter of a century, I sat with terrorists and their frontmen in local government. They never outgunned me on the ground and they never outgunned me in the democratic Chamber. That is why I would be back at Stormont. It would be a hard and risky road but so much better than this, because ever since we endorsed the Belfast agreement as a basis for transition from outright terrorism to democratic structures, a malleable government have betrayed us. They have consistently made impassable any pathway to normality that would facilitate unionists' rights and traditions. On another occasion I may have time to articulate the full extent of that betrayal. For now, I simply ask colleagues in this House, against the background that I have just defined, to evaluate this legislation.
	The critical issue here is the proposal to establish a seven-council arrangement to replace the current 26-council structure. Ulster Unionists wanted significant change. They would have preferred 15 councils—a local authority coterminous with each parliamentary constituency, with the four Belfast constituencies coming together and with constituency boundaries already accepted by the public and parties alike. If pressed, we might have settled for 11. But the seven-council structure proposed will give militant Sinn Fein absolute control over a greater geographical half of Northern Ireland. It will inevitably create a Balkan-type structure that will be untenable for unionists in that part, and I greatly fear that the reciprocal could also happen. Why would any Government want to risk that?
	Does the Minister really believe that these changes are not intended to focus large swathes of Northern Ireland towards a southern Irish aspect? He is wrong. That is exactly what some intend. The uncertainty and inevitable resentment that the Government are about to unleash fills me with dread for the future.
	If the Government had been sincere, would we not by now have heard the basis on which the first change in local government in Northern Ireland for 33 years was predicated? Is it not an issue worth proper debate in a proper Bill? But no. After 33 violent years, Northern Ireland is being presented with another diktat: take it or leave it. Let us just remember what happened to the 1985 diktat, and be warned.
	What infrastructural audit has been carried out? Council staff will have to have working accommodation and, since the Minister told us in Committee that he has no new money, one must assume that existing facilities will be utilised. Twenty-six existing council headquarters will somehow have to accommodate seven new councils. We can envisage the organisational and communication chaos. But no one has a blueprint on how it is intended that this will be resolved.
	What detailed financial audit has been carried out? None, if that can be believed. But is the Northern Ireland Office not good at off-the-cuff estimates? In answer to my specific Written Questions, has it not confessed that that is the methodology by which it is intent on destroying—in fairness, I think that it said "reforming"—our grammar and secondary schools sector of education? That matter, vital to the future of our children, is also to be dealt with by Order in Council. No—we are not to be allowed to participate in that game either.
	To go back to finance, local government in Northern Ireland accounts at present for only 3 per cent to 3.5 per cent of total public expenditure. After these changes, that will rise to less than 10 per cent. All this talk about efficiency is nonsense. The real spending is done by quangos and that will continue with only a few minor changes. Let us not even mention consultants who are employed to put a gloss on government's indiscretion. Government just hit on a ball-park number and fill in the details later. What a way to run a business.
	Of course, we are told that such eminent bodies as the Institute of Directors have backed the seven-council proposal. I have been in local government for almost 20 years, and I have never known the Institute of Directors and all those other noble bodies to interface with local government on either a regular or a casual basis. We really ought to wonder why the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Alliance Party oppose a seven-council arrangement. Will the Minister tell us whether the more progressive elements of Sinn Fein are actually in favour of this seven-council proposal? This might just be like the Government's "on the run" fiasco and not quite what Sinn Fein wants.
	Is it not relevant that the Northern Ireland Local Government Authority representing all political parties, opposed seven councils? And is not the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers, or SOLACE, working agreeably in partnership with NILGA on the basis of its position? The Government have no real clothes on this issue and are operating against the expressed wishes of all those bodies and a clear majority of the Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
	I conclude by referring to issues that concern the Government's own local government watchdog, the Local Government Staff Commission, to which it has not had answers. Those issues relate to the human rights aspects of the review of public administration. We are not debating them specifically here, but, I promise, they are inextricably linked.
	What specific proposals have the Government made concerning the transfer of staff between the present councils and the new establishment, and from the Civil Service into the new establishment? Have the Government even the remotest idea how they plan to populate the new council with staff from two sources—those moving from within local government and those transferring from the Civil Service, quangos and agencies? How will they deal with displaced staff and, taking into consideration Section 75 and New TSN, how will the location of new councils be decided?
	I could continue but, as the Government have not thought through their tactics and as they do not really have a strategy that relates specifically to the issue before us, where is the point? I will bet a pound to a penny that the simple issue of the recruitment and interviewing of chief executives, for example, is not thought through. Will recruitment be a ring-fenced process or will it be done by public advertisement?
	This order is a travesty. I regret that this House has not been able to take the ultimate punitive action on this matter. It is time that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stopped to listen. It is time that he stopped digging up the cricket pitch on which the game of peace and democracy is to be played out.

Lord Rooker: The point is that these bodies actually sat down and considered sending in a written response and commented on the numbers between the seven, 11 and 15, and you cannot dismiss them. The fact that several hundred others did not express a view on the number of bodies would not be taken into account. I freely admit that, because they wanted to put other views that were not relevant. But of the bodies that took the trouble to say, "We think we have something that is worth saying on the number of bodies in terms of service delivery to the Northern Ireland community", nearly two-thirds said that seven was better than 11 or 15. The noble Lord says that that does not really matter because they are not part of local government and are not involved in democratic accountability. But they were the ones who looked at the issue from a wider point of view and offered an opinion on the number of councils.
	Sixty-two per cent said that they preferred the seven-council configuration in terms of coterminosity. I gave the reasons in Grand Committee and shall not go over them tonight, but coterminosity is not an unimportant factor with regard to health, education and the reorganisation of the police. Coterminosity is a factor, and I do not deny that greater coterminosity and a larger range of "one-to-one" is achieved with seven councils than is the case with 11 or 15 councils. At my request, we considered a lower number of councils— five rather than seven—but the seven-council option gave the best result on the matrix of coterminosity, as well as with regard to the other factors involved.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Amendment No. 65 not moved.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I shall speak also to Amendment No. 67. The effect of the amendments would be to ensure that the two types of licensed premises set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) would be exempt from any charges imposed by virtue of the clause. The first type would be those premises whose principal use did not involve the sale of alcohol; and the second would be those premises where the availability of alcohol is not the main purpose for which individuals enter them. The way that I drafted the amendments means that they should not fall foul of the Minister's objections on the previous amendment, Amendment No. 64. Indeed, his answer to my noble friend Lord Bridgeman was that premises would be exempted anyway, if the availability of alcohol was not the main reason why people went into them—or, I think that he said, stayed in them. At this late hour, that conjures up some interesting ideas about what they might be doing.
	My argument is that it is wrong to leave it to the discretion of the Secretary of State to make such exemptions. There seems no reason to include such premises in the charging scheme. The Minister has already said that they will not be included. If not, why not? If so, why not state that in the Bill? The removal of the word "only" in the amendment also has the advantage of allowing the possibility of creating further exemptions over and above those set out in paragraphs (a) and (b). Surely that is a sensible way to proceed. There must be the possibility of other exemptions, if it becomes demonstrably clear that certain licensed premises are unjustly caught up in the Bill without good reason or are disproportionately burdened. It is right that regulation should be able to take account of those circumstances.
	This is one of the key concerns of the licensed trade. The representative organisations, such as the Wine and Spirit Trade Association, the British Retail Consortium and the Association of Convenience Stores, support the amendments, so they therefore have the backing of a significant number of stakeholders who could be affected should the Bill become law in its present form.
	I now find myself in horror because I used the word "stakeholders". Ten years of Labour government have clearly had some dreadful effect on me. I shall take the medicine tonight and get rid of that. Goodness me.
	Those bodies, which represent responsible licensed businesses, support any measure to tackle violent crime and alcohol disorder. They have made that clear throughout all their discussions both with me and, I know, with the Government. They have actively supported involuntary codes of conduct and schemes to encourage responsible drinking and the retailing of alcohol. However, they are unanimous in voicing their concern that Chapter 2 would have a disproportionate effect on the retail sector without actually tackling the root causes of the issue. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The amendments seek to create a right of appeal for licence holders against the designation of an alcohol disorder zone to a bespoke alcohol disorder zone tribunal. We have designed an alcohol disorder zone process to be flexible and speedy to tackle alcohol-related crime and disorder with the minimum of delay. At the same time, we have provided key checks and balances to be put into the process. They comprise a joint local authority/police trigger for an alcohol disorder zone in which each party must consent to designation. So they have to be satisfied that it is right and give their consent. They also include a formal consultation process lasting 28 days; an eight-week period following that to allow the commencement of the action plan—though it can be shorter if it is clear that there is no intention to implement the plan; and a formal three-monthly review of designation. There are a number of elements to the process.
	Additionally, Clause 12(9) provides that regulations may make provision for appeals relating to the payment, collection and enforcement of the charge and liability for payment of the charge. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that it does not seem entirely sensible that each time there is a challenge, a judicial review has to be sought. That is inappropriate. A more workable scheme than a tribunal, an appeals process like a tribunal, makes a lot of sense. We have said that we will work with those involved—whom you might call "stakeholders", if you are the noble Lord, Lord Dahrendorf, or "the affected alcohol community". There are lots of descriptions at hand. We are working with this body of able folk to see how we can best deliver this and link it into existing local government procedures. So we are consulting with those who should be consulted. I think that that is the best way of achieving it. That will provide a robust set of checks and balances, without the need for building in a potentially lengthy appeals process, whether it is set out on the face of the Bill or through regulations.
	I understand the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord about appeals. However, I think we have set up a situation which provides for sufficient checks and balances, without the need for a whole new tier of bureaucracy to determine appeals. We have to set that elaborate process on one side. Clause 12(9) makes provision for a system of appeals for a range of things relating to payment, collection and so on, which I referred to earlier. I do not think that we are going as far as the noble Baroness and the noble Lord want, but we have put in place a process of robust checking, and we have made the provisions I have referred to in Clause 12(9). I hope that that will prove to be satisfactory. We will, of course, listen with great care to the stakeholders in this part of legislation.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for his support. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, responded by saying that the Government like the idea of having more of a tribunal system and that they want something robust which has checks and balances. But then he accused me of trying to introduce a bureaucracy, when it appeared that the more he went into his explanation, the more his system became more bureaucratic than mine. There is a fundamental disagreement between us on what is needed on the face of the Bill to ensure a fair way in which the licence trade may make its appeals against what could be a significant payment by it on a monthly basis. I would never claim that the proposals put forward in my clauses are perfect. But they do represent my view that it is only fair that there should be an independent tribunal, not a bureaucracy, which would give fairness and equity to the licensed trade. It is on that basis that I will ask the opinion of the Committee.

Viscount Bridgeman: In moving Amendment No. 72, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 73. The amendments follow on from the previous amendments, to which my noble friend Lady Anelay has spoken. The purpose of this group of amendments is to try to get some idea of when draft regulations will be published relating to the charges that will be imposed on licence holders in alcohol disorder zones.
	It was as long ago as last October that the Government were asked in another place when these draft regulations might be available, and six months later we still have not had a chance to examine them. Bearing mind the amount of detail that is being left to regulations, can the Minister give the Committee an assurance that draft regulations will be available to be scrutinised before Report stage of the Bill.
	It has been left to regulations to specify the rate of charges, exemptions and discounts, payments and enforcement and the appeals process. We have already discussed the issue of regulations that specify what the money raised by the scheme can and cannot be used for. These details are absolutely critical if we are to get a clear picture of what the effect of an alcohol disorder zone designation will have—both on businesses and on alcohol-related disorder itself. Before conferring such sweeping powers on local authorities, does the Minister agree that this House needs greater time for scrutiny of the details of such schemes? I beg to move.

Lord Borrie: The noble Viscount is a little unfair in using the word "whim". I cannot imagine a local authority designating an alcohol disorder zone unless it is pretty sure that these conditions are met. I generally agree with the noble Viscount that objective tests are better than subjective ones. But the likelihood of repetition of the nuisance, annoyance or disorder, as set out in subsection (1)(c), must be based on the sensible appreciation of the situation by somebody—in this case, the local authority. It cannot be objectively satisfied. In this particular instance, I think that the amendment should not be carried.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The noble Lord raises some important issues. Of course, one would not expect the licensees to contribute through the alcohol disorder zone to policing another far-away part of the town. But one might expect the charges raised as a result of the alcohol disorder zone to contribute towards the cost of extra policing in a street or open space close by. Or one might expect licensees, for example, to help through the alcohol disorder zone fund to pay for taxi marshals in an adjacent street or on part of the main streets close to where the licensed premises are located. I think that that is a reasonable expectation of what an alcohol disorder zone charging regime would contribute towards.
	The local authority will want to consider very carefully—no doubt it will be part of detailed considerations and consultations locally—designating a zone which is very tightly drawn and which includes the area where the nuisance is most likely to be repeated. That is how we see it working as a matter of practical application.
	Amendment No. 78 deals with other measures that should be properly considered before getting to the point at which an alcohol disorder zone is identified as the appropriate remedy. The noble Lord referred to the Licensing Act 2003, and said that those provisions should be fully used to ensure that individual premises have appropriate operating schedules to deal with potential problems.
	I agree in general with that approach. The guidance to the provision will set out explicitly that alcohol disorder zones are a measure of last resort, and the circumstances in which they should be used. As an example, where there is a problem with individual premises, of course it would be more sensible to use a licence review against those premises than to declare it an alcohol disorder zone. As I said, alcohol disorder zones are about getting licensees to adopt collective responsibility. The Licensing Act 2003 greatly strengthens local authorities' hands against individual premises, and the alcohol disorders zones policy adds to that and provides them with a valuable tool to establish that collective responsibility as a matter of principle.
	I do not think that the noble Lord's amendments are necessary, nor do they add a further layer of clarification, which we can fairly say is already there in the Bill, and will be there as a product of the regulations and guidance that we shall consult on later in the process. I understand the sentiments but our approach makes more sense. I hope that my comments have also satisfied some of the concerns about the way in which the scheme will be constructed.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	House resumed.
	House adjourned at ten o'clock.
	Wednesday, 26 April 2006.